"No Enemy, but Peace", a Comic About Real Heroes

This has to be my oddest find ever. In a comics store I found a comic written by a US Marine about a real-life story of heroism and courage during the battle of At-Tarmiyah.

Very good reading and illustrations. You immediately note that the author knows what he is writing about.

There is a more extensive comic coming out in the near future.

Please support this small operation by buying the comic here.

Cheers,

War Gaming in the Military

The Training and Simulation Journal has an article about war gaming in the armed forces around the globe.

The Army realized that the new generation, or Generation Y, is a significant percentage of the Army and that it learns more efficiently using a game than with PowerPoint, said Don Toliver, operations director at the National Simulation Center (NSC) at the Army Combined Arms Center and Training at Fort Leavenworth, Kan.

Cheers,

DCS Black Shark: Tactical Landing ... Sorta

1.5 km away from the runway

Runway is getting closer ...

Gear down!

The runway gets buried under the nose. Thank Lord for TrackIR!

The dive ...

From the cockpit, closely watching the airspeed ...

Pulling the cyclic like there was no tomorrow

Finally level flight

Touchdown!

Cheers,

DCS Black Shark: Tactics Primer (Part 1)

This series of entries are focused in attack helicopter tactics at the individual level. Off course, attack helicopters almost never take-off to combat individually. At a later time, I will expand this series to tactics to be used at the platoon level. On the meantime, the tactical principles in this primer will help you to fly as a part of a formation.

This series of entries are based in stuff I gathered on the web. I condensed and adapted most of the stuff found and I encourage you to check those original sources. The sources will be cited at the end of each installment.

Flying to the objective

Compared to fixed wing aircraft, the attack helicopter doesn’t have the luxury of being able to fly very high or fast. It’s almost ironic that these two apparent shortcomings of the attack helicopter are actually its two advantages: being able to both fly extremely slow and at a low altitude that allows it to evade enemy anti-air weapon systems. In addition, the attack helicopter has a very high maneuverability that allows it to change the flight regime in small space and time spans.

Unfortunately, the advances in radar and infrared detection technologies are always a threat for the attack helicopter pilot. The biggest challenge for the attack helicopter pilot is to fly towards the objective avoiding detection. The best way to avoid detection is using terrain as cover.

If you are a virtual pilot of fixed-wing combat aircraft, it’s time for a paradigm shift. You are used to dive majestically from the blue with your wings pregnant of fire and the arrogant attitude of a God that entertains himself dealing death to the poor earth-laden mortals. Those times are gone. You are now like a hero of the ancient Greek mythology, half-god and half-mortal. The earth where the soldier lives and dies is now your life and death. The eternal paradoxes of tactical land combat are now your salvation and perdition. Being pilot and soldier at the same time will require the most from your abilities and intelligence. This is your time of greatest glory.

One way to avoid detection by using terrain as cover is the so-called “nap of the earth” (NoE) flying. In NoE flying, the pilot flies at approximately 6-7 meters above the ground and at a speed of 90 Km/h. The vast majority of modern radar systems cannot detect targets flying at a very low altitude. In addition, Doppler-based radars are designed to ignore returns moving at speeds of less than 100 Km/h in order to avoid detecting civilian traffic. During a NoE flight, the pilot chooses a route that allows the maximum terrain cover. The base of hills, around (not over) elevations and behind crowded terrain is ideal for NoE flying. In mountainous terrain, attack helicopter pilots usually fly at an altitude that is halfway between the base and the top of the mountains.

As exhilarating as dangerous, NoE flying requires a lot of concentration.

NoE flying is not problem-free. The slow speed and the low altitude expose the attack helicopter to small-arms fire and un-guided rockets. An alternative to NoE flying is “contour-chasing” (CC) flying, which is done at higher altitudes and speeds. CC flying is used when the presence of enemy anti-aerial or aircraft is less likely. For a CC flight, the pilot maintains an altitude of 12-15 meters and a speed of 150 Km/h. The pilot doesn’t fly around the hills but rather maintains a straight course, keeping a constant altitude above the ground.

CC flying has the advantage of higher speed at the expense of concealment

Coming up next, “10 Rules to Live by”

Source for this entry:

http://www.101st.org/Data/5.27.htm

Cheers,

Battle Group Commander: Episode One

In a previous entry, I shared the news about a sale at Shrapnel Games.

Thanks to the sale event and the coupon I mentioned in my previous entry, you can get "Battle Group Commander: Episode One" for $12.49.

Sure, this game features only four scenarios. Yet I can assure you will be hooked and get hours of gameplay and tactical goodness out of this game. If you have been in the fence about this line of war games, this a golden opportunity.

Cheers,

FM 3-24.2 Tactics in Counterinsurgency

After being published and quickly taken off from the US Army Combined Arms Center last April, copies of the manual appeared in several blogs and websites.

Now it is available from the "Small Wars Journal" website.

It is very exciting to witness doctrine in the making.

The field manual is 300 pages long and I'm still reading it. Two stray thoughts about it:

• From the point of view of employing armed forces to kill insurgents/enemy combatants the US Army never suffered major tactical defeats in the recent past. This field manual not only revises the employment of troops for the destruction of enemy combatants/insurgents but also integrates such activity with wining the hearts and minds of the civil population and preserving the civilian infrastructure. This is not a trivial thing.
• Some parts are really eye catchers. Like this passage in section 5.2 (Characteristics of the Offense):

  The characteristics of the offense are surprise, audacity, tempo, and concentration. For COIN, an additional characteristic, flexibility, is added.

Wait a minute, I thought that flexibility was always a part of the offense ... :)

• Some other parts are surprising, at least to me. Like when the manual lists the types of offensive operations, one of them is "movement to contact", which includes search-and-attack and cordon-and-search operations. In my understanding, the greatest problem in battling insurgencies is that the enemy combatants always have the choice of when and where to show up. Movement to contact may be a bit too optimistic IMHO. But the actual surprise to me is that in the manual there is a mention of using reconnaissance forces to find the insurgents. Regular recce units?
  

Cheers,

Modern Military Thinkers: John Boyd

John Boyd had both the mind of the bold, daring soldier who never surrenders and that of a brilliant scholar whose thirst for truth uncovers new patterns in places where nobody thought there was anything else to question.

He is known mostly for his "observation, orientation, decision, action" loop (OODA loop). This is unfortunate because his contributions are as wide-ranging as the ones from titans like Clausewitz. It is also unfortunate because OODA is not a loop but rather a cycle. But anyway, most people's knowledge of Clausewitz doesn't go farther than "war is the continuation of politics by other means".

As I'm doing with every military thinker I post about, I will leave the task of exploring Boyd's theories to my readers. A little warning, you are in for a wild ride.

One of the spin-offs from Boyd's thinking is the so-called maneuver warfare, which was adopted by the US Marine Corps as a doctrinal framework. There is also a movement leaded by Chet Richards, that applies Boyd's thinking to business.


Boyd never wrote a book. His preferred way of exposing ideas were his legendary briefings, which lasted half a day. The text of these briefings can be found in the web. Frank Osinga recently published a book which is the ultimate analysis of Boyd's theories: "Science, Strategy and War". This book is a bit pricey from Amazon and I would rather recommend the print-on-demand service from Routledge.






One of the things that impressed me in Osinga's book is his analysis of the context in which Boyd formulated his ideas. According to Osinga, Boyd's experiences as a fighter pilot, his self education and the scientific ambiance contemporary to his studies are important to understand his theories. I also recommend the biographical book by Robert Coram "Boyd: The Fighter Pilot Who Changed the Art of War".





Cheers,

DCS Black Shark: Patch Delayed

Wags has posted some information on the official forums about the upcoming patch for DCS Black Shark.

The patch is in-work and we still hope to release it in the next month or two. In the process of fixing bugs and adding new features, we’ve had to go back and re-do some of the multiplayer code. This has led to longer than expected development time.

There is also information about other Eagle Dynamics products in this thread.

Cheers,

A Tank Platoon in the Defense, Part 2: Tactical Misadventures in Steel Beasts ProPE

Continued from here.

I played this scenario with some gentlemen from a very well-known simulation community. The identities of the players are withheld to protect the innocent. :) All tanks in the platoon manned by humans except for tank #3, which was handled by the computer. I played as commander of tank #2.

Our platoon commander decided to go as the FRAGO suggested: stay in BP1, inflict some damage, call for an arty smoke mission and reverse to the alternate battle positions.

We never got a chance.

The enemy attacked our right flank (yes, the flank I was holding) and overran my position. When we detected the enemy tanks, they were at a shouting distance from my position. The call for artillery-smoke from our commander was too late as the enemy was already near our position. The enemy moved to the back to our position and took my tank, then tank #1. Tank #3 got destroyed while it was trying to reverse towards safety. Tank #4 made an heroic attempt to eliminate the fast moving enemy tanks. He took 2 of them with him.

The mission went catastrophically bad.

Below are my thoughts on why I think we failed.

• The prepared dug-in firing positions at BP1 had good fields of fire on EA Dog. Good but not optimal.

Click the image for an expanded view. Left: map, showing our initial positions. Right column: birds-eye view from BP1 towards EA Dog. Note the prepared tank positions in front of each tank. Tank #3 and #4 had good overlapping fields of fire, but tanks #1 and 2 were separated by a small elevation covered by a patch of vegetation and they ended up with different views of EA Dog.

A close up of the individual positions of tanks #1 and #2. Note the slight elevation that separates both, which resulted in non-shared fields of fire. Click the image for an expanded view.

• The withdrawal route from BP1 to BP2A and BP2B had no cover or concealment. We should have realized that if the artillery-delivered smoke would fail its purpose (as it did), the withdrawal towards the alternate BPs would have exposed us to enemy observation and fire.

The arrow indicates my withdrawal route, which featured terrain flat as a pancake. The thing in front of my tank is a prepared dug-in tank fighting position.

A bit off topic, I want to mention that my tank took 8 hits during this mission. The 9th was the charm ...

The red rods indicate the direction of the munition hitting my tank. Click in the image for an expanded view.

Cheers,

A Tank Platoon in the Defense, Part 1: Tactical Misadventures in Steel Beasts ProPE

One of the things I like about Steel Beasts ProPE (SBProPE) is that it forces you to think really hard about tactics. The virtual battlefield in SBProPE is fast and brutal and the only way to survive is to get serious about what you are doing with your tank.

This scenario I'm writing about today is part of the older scenarios in SBProPE. It features a platoon of M1 Abrams defending objective "Star" in a sector two kilometers wide or so. The enemy, a motorized rifle company is advancing from west to east.

The OPORD in this scenario is more like a FRAGO, which is correct I guess given the size of the scenario. In the FRAGO, the commander of blue forces orders us to avoid the enemy getting to objective "Star". The commander also has provided some maneuver and tactical guidelines which are depicted in the next map as operational graphics.


Two recon HMMWVs are in front of blue forces as combat patrols and will provide warning of the approaching enemy. Our M1 Abrams tanks are supposed to inflict as many casualties on the enemy by firing from battle position 1 (BP1) towards engagement area "Dog" (EA Dog). On order, we are to withdraw towards battle positions BP2A and BP2B under the cover of artillery-delivered smoke and destroy the remaining enemy forces in engagement area "Cat" (EA Cat).

Simple, uh?

Not quite.

For starters, the scenario is about using tanks, intrinsically offensive weapons, in a defensive role. The British military theorist J.F.C. Fuller, in his "The Foundations of the Science of War", suggested that the basic three actions of combat are: move, strike and protect. According to Fuller, in a typical weapon system, each of these actions influences the other. One soldier cannot fire (strike) as precisely when he is running (move). In addition, if the soldier is running (move), his cover (protect) is reduced. The tank is not exempt from these factors, yet it has a superior mobility (move) that can be used with little compromise of its firepower (strike) and protection against enemy fire (protect). The ability to "move strike and protect" at the same time constitutes the biggest advantage the tank has over other weapon systems. Renouncing to move your tank, as you would do in a defense scenario like the one detailed above, is giving away one advantage. And since the "move, strike and protect" factors seem to combine synergistically, loosing one of three is loosing much more than1/3 of your capabilities. Just staying alive in such conditions requires mastery and study. When tanks stay put in the battlefield with inexperienced crews inside, bad things happen.

FM 17-15 (Tank Platoon) has a whole chapter devoted to defensive operations. In chapter 4 there is this important paragraph:

The two patterns described in FM 100-5 are mobile and area defenses. A mobile defense is executed to destroy the attacking force by permitting the enemy to advance into a position that exposes him to counterattack by a mobile reserve. The focus of area defenses is on retention of terrain; defending units engage the enemy from an interlocking series of positions and destroy him, largely by direct fires.

Since in this scenario we lack a mobile reserve, in this scenario we will be conducting an area defense.

Continues here ...

Cheers,